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Abstract
Using a macro-econometric model that is speci¯ed for the cur-
rent Chinese economy, we investigate the performance of monetary
policy in China with the assumption (which anyway will hold in the
near future) that capital market was open. Our purpose is to ¯nd
whether there is a possibility for China to keep the independence of
monetary policy under the ¯xed exchange regime while the capital
market is open. For this, we suggest some institutional arrangements.
Given these institutional restrictions, we ¯nd that the open economy
tri-lemma, which is widely accepted in academy, will no longer hold.
This indicates that the monetary policy can still keep its e®ective in
stabilizing domestic economy when capital market is open and the
exchange rate is ¯xed. The dynamic analysis of the model further
shows that the ¯xed exchange regime will strengthen the macroeco-
nomic stability while the uner-valuded RMB is necessary for the target
exchange rate to be sustainable.
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11 Introduction
The issue on RMB exchange rate is increasingly concerned not only in China
but also internationally among academies, governments and publics. It is
generally believed that RMB is under-valued due to the intervene at the
foreign exchange market by the monetary authority in China. It is also
believed that the under-valued RMB causes the huge trade surplus in China
against U. S. and other developed countries. Therefore, China should, as
called by U. S. government, raise the value of RMB or even give up the
current ¯xed exchange regime and switch to more market oriented system of
°oating exchange. It is argued that the swtich to the foating exchange will
not only move RMB toward its equilibrium value (so that trade surplus can
be reduced), but is also desperately needed if China wants continuously to
keep its independence of monetary policy when the capital market is open in
the near future. Apparently, this is the argument derived from the theorem
of open economy tri-lemma (or triple-impossible), which has now been widely
accepted in the academy.
According the theorem of open economy tri-lemma, if capital market is
open while exchange rate is ¯xed, the capital in°ow (or out°ow) will equal-
ize the interest rates in domestic and world market. This will leave no space
for the monetary policy to stabilize the domestic economy via interest rate
mechanism. On the other hand, if the exchange rate is °oating, the un-
certainty in exchange rate will weaken the connection of domestic interest
rate to the interest rate in the world market. This will leave some space for
monetary policy to be e®ective in stabilizing the domestic economy. This
is the major result since the Mundell-Fleming model in 1960's.1 The recent
new open economy macroeconomy initiated by the Redux model of Obstfeld
and Rogo® (1995) does not change the basic result.2 The tri-lemma theorem
has also lead to the current bipolar view, which basically reject the ¯xed or
pegged exchange regime as a possible selection of exchange rate system. 3
Although the issue remains whether China should reduce its target ex-
change rate to appreciate RMB,4 this paper tries to provide the following
1See Mundell (1963, 1964), Fleming (1962) and Dornbusch (1976).
2For the recent review on the new open economy macroeconomics, see Lane (2001).
3See Fischer (2002), Summer (2000) among others.
4Indeed, we believe that the RMB appreciation is not the ¯nal solution to the current
huge trade surplus in China. A more foundmental reason for the trade surplus is the trade
pattern (especially the import pattern) of the current economy in China: the import in
China is highly export-detemined. We thus expect that while the RMB appreciation will
reduce the export from China the import to China will then be equally reduced. This
will be veri¯ed by the behavior functions of export and import as estimated latter in the
paper. However, this will not be the major concern in our this paper.
2arguments:
Argument 1: The tri-lemma theorem can be hold only under
certain institutional restrictions. Given the institutional arrange-
ments as suggested latter in the paper, the monetary policy can
be e®ective independently even if the exchange rate is ¯xed and
the capital market is open.
Argument 2: The ¯xed exchange regime in China will ben-
e¯t the domestic economy as well its trade partner in terms of
macroeconomic stability.
Argument 3: To sustain the ¯xed exchange regime, the target
exchange rate should be set to the level at which the value of
RMB is under-valued.
These arguments will be provided in a macro-econometric model speci¯ed
for the current Chinese economy. Among the three arguments, we ¯nd that
the most important one is the ¯rst. The other two arguments can be easily
derived once the argument on the tri-lemma theorem is veri¯ed. It is well
known that in those, which generate tri-lemma theorem, such as Mundell-
Fleming model and Redux model, there exist implicitly some institutional
restrictions which make all the ¯nancial assets are perfectly substitutable
and thus the variety of interest rates can be merged essentially into one in
terms of volatility.5 Since one of the interest rates, such as bond interest rate,
must be restricted to the interest rate in the world market under the ¯xed
exchange regime when the capital market is open, the other interest rates,
such as loan interest rate, can hardly be impacted by the monetary policy.
The monetary policy thus loses its independence to stabilize the domestic
economy via interest rate mechanism. However, as we will ¯nd in this paper,
there exist some institutional arrangements under which the variety of ¯nan-
cial assets are not perfectly substitutable and thus their interest rates could
be varied in di®erent directions even if the capital market is open and the
exchange rate is ¯xed. We also ¯nd that these institutional arrangements
is plaussible to be implemented practically under the appropriate regulation
within the commercial banking system.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the environ-
mental and institutional properties of current Chinese economy. Section 3
sets out the model. Section 4 provides the analysis, which allows us to derive
our three arguments. Section 5 concludes.
5The empirically observed deviations among di®erent interest rates are often named as
risk premium.
32 Institution and Environment
This section discusses the environment and institution (including the future
possible transform) that may help us to understand not only how China can
grow on average at a higher rate since the economic reform, but also the
construction of the model that will be presented in the next section.
2.1 Dual Structure
Since economic reform started in 1978, China has undergone substantial
decentralization. This decentralization can be understood in two respects.
First, the government has abandoned the previous central planning system
and has given autonomy to state-owned enterprises in deciding their price
and quantity in most non-¯nancial sectors. Second, decentralization has
also allowed the rapid growth of non-state enterprises in many competitive
industries. This decentralization process made the Chinese economy more
market oriented and economic resources more e±ciently allocated. One of
the achievements in the e±ciency of resource allocation is to free the huge
amount of surplus labor in the rural areas of China.
The dual structure in rural and urban areas is an obvious feature of
developing economy of China. In rural areas, each family is endowed with
a piece of land that may sustain the family's living but at a very low level
compared to the standard of living in urban areas. Since the land for each
family is extremely limited, there is an enormous surplus of labor in the rural
areas of China. Economic reform and the emergence of a large amount of
non state-owned enterprises has allowed the labor surplus in rural areas to
move into urban areas as has been occurring in the past. Since the labor
surplus in rural areas is so huge, the labor market in city has always been
in over-supplied. This further indicates that wages in urban areas is not
sensitive to the labor market, but only to in°ation and productivity.6 We
should note that this developing feature of the Chinese economy is exactly
what Lewis, a Nobel laureate in 1979, described in his seminal paper on
developing economics (see Lewis 1954).
The existence of a dual structure has an important implication in ex-
plaining China's economic growth. As many have argued, the major driving
force of high growth in China is the high growth in investment.7 The high
growth in investment creates not only fast accumulation of capacity but also
high growth in demand. The fast accumulation of capacity requires the ab-
6This will be veri¯ed in our estimation of wage equation (see section 3.9).
7See Lin (2000), Lin, Cai and Zhou (2003) and Brandt and Zhu (2000, 2001)
4sorption of more people to work in urban areas. Therefore, high growth in
investment is not possible without su±cient labor surplus.
2.2 Credit Plan and Stabilization Policy
High growth in investment is also not possible without su±cient ¯nancial
resources. In contrast to most OECD countries, the major ¯nancial resource
for investment in China is credit. In past years, the monetary authority in
China has set up a yearly target growth in the money supply, M1 and M2.
Once the target has been set up, the monetary authority will employ the
credit plan as its principle instrument to implement the target.
In each year's credit plan, the state banks are given credit quotas, which
can be regarded as the target on the amount they could and should lend in
total for investment and other purposes. Sometimes the credit quotas are
given along with a variety of details with respect to the provinces, indus-
tries and state and non-state ¯rms. Although in most cases the credit plan
is only indicative under which the state banks were given some discretion
over their lending activities, occasionally the government resorts to using
administrative mechanisms to implement the credit plan.8
The credit supply in China can be regarded as being cheap and easy.
Such cheap and easy credit can be observed from several statistics. As we
can ¯nd in Table 1, the average real interest rate in loan supply is about
2% in China, much lower than other OECD countries. In the same time,
the average growth rate of the money supply is about 20%, which is not
only much higher than the level of OECD countries (about 6-7%), but also
signi¯cantly higher than the nominal growth rate (about 16%) of GDP in
China. We shall also remark that while the growth rate of the money supply
is so high, the state banks are also su®ering huge amount of non-performing
loans.
Table 1: Credit Comparison: China and Some OECD Countries9
China U.S. Germany France.
























8In the view of Brandt and Zhu (2000) and (2001), it is the alteration of indicative and
administrative credit plan that generates the business cycles in China.
9The data for U.S., Germany and France comes from OECD (2004). The data for
China comes from National Bureau of Statistics of China (2004).
5The easy and cheap credit provided by the government via its state bank-
ing system is certainly an important transitional feature of the Chinese econ-
omy. It re°ects the strong intention of government to use its monetary policy
to promote economic growth in addition to usual demand management.
2.3 The Fixed Exchange Regime
The exchange rate system in China has historically been regarded as a ¯xed
exchange rate, though the target exchange rate has been changed several
times since the economic reform. It is only until recently (July 21, 2005) that
China has switched to the regime of manageable °oating exchange. Due to
the developing feature of the current Chinese economy, a stable exchange rate
is considered to be important for the healthy and stable ¯nancial environment
that will bene¯t the economic development in China. Indeed, we also believe
that a stable exchange rate of RMB also bene¯t the world economy, though
there is an issue what level of exchange rate should be stabilized.
Both the ¯xed exchange rate system and the manageable °oating ex-
change rate system imply the active involvement of the central bank in the
foreign exchange market. Due to such similarity, we shall in this paper treat
them as being equal. In particular we shall assume that the central bank
want to stabilize the exchange rate at x¤. In the manageable °oating system,
this x¤ can be explained as a range. We shall remark that for the central
bank, the involvement in foreign exchange market is somehow similar to its
open market operation in the bond market: both a®ect the money supply
circulated in the economy. The di®erence is the objective to stabilize and the
assets transacted in the market. Indeed, the purchase of foreign exchange
(U.S. dollars) is one of the major channels in the past for the monetary au-
thority in China to increase the money supply in addition to the credit plan
mechanism. As we will ¯nd in this paper, such an increase is possible only
when the target exchange rate of RMB against U.S. dollars is set below its
market value (or making RMB deliberately undervalued).
2.4 Financial Reform
The credit plan mechanism of money supply in current Chinese economy
indicates that the money supply in China is exogenous and is able to be
controlled by government. Yet the exogenous property of money supply can
not be independent from the ownership properties of the commercial banks:
in the current Chinese economy, the commercial banks are almost all state-
owned. It is the state-owned commercial banks that allow the credit plan
mechanism to work.
6Recently, China has begun its ¯nancial reform. One of the objectives of
this reform is to transform gradually the current state-owned banks into the
modern corporation with shareholding. In particular, a system of strategic
partnership will be adopted, according to which a worldwide well-known ¯-
nancial corporation will be introduced to be a strategic partner (so that it will
hold a signi¯cant share) in a current state bank. We would expect that with
the progress of such reform, the credit plan mechanism will gradually become
ine®ective. Another important reform in the ¯nancial system in China is the
gradual openness of capital market due to the WTO agreement signed by the
Chinese government in 2003. This will lead us to anther expectation: in the
near future, the money in China can be circulated within the world capital
market via capital in°ow and out°ow.
The ¯nancial reforms as have just discussed will pose the following chal-
lenges to the macroeconomic policy mechanism as is currently working in
Chinese economy:
² First, the ine®ectiveness of credit plan and the worldwide circulation
of money will make the money in China no longer be exogenous and
controllable, but more likely endogenous.
² Second, the monetary policy may even lose its independency if China
still wants to keep its ¯xed exchange regime.
The ¯rst indicates that the monetary authority in China will have to
switch to targeting interest rate rather than money supply via credit plan.
The second challenge, which results from the theorem of open economy tri-
lemma, is indeed the major concern in the paper.
Should China have to give up the ¯xed exchange regime when the capital
market is open in the near future? For a developing country like China, this
may have the cost that the economy will be more vulnerable to the outside
shock. But if China wants to maintain its ¯xed exchange regime, is there
a possibility, e.g., by some institutional arrangements, to remain the active
monetary policy for stabilizing the domestic economy?
2.5 Suggested Institutional Arrangements
We believe that there does exist some institutional arrangements that will
allow the Chinese economy to maintain the ¯xed exchange regime, but with-
out losing the independence of monetary policy even if the capital market is
open. These institutional arrangements include the follows:
7Arrangement 1: There is a block for the loan issued from com-
mercial banks to be used for the business of ¯nancial investment,
such as buying the bonds in the bond market;
Arrangement 2: There is a block for the commercial banks
to engage in the business of ¯nancial investment (such as buying
bonds).
Arrangement 3: The commercial bank (and only commercial
bank), whenever they feel necessary, are permitted to borrow or
deposit their reserve at the discount window given the discount
rates settled by the central bank.
In the followed analysis, we shall evaluate the e®ectiveness of monetary
policy for the future Chinese economy under such institutional arrangements.
3 The Model
Given the three institutional arrangements as discussed in the last section,
we shall in this section construct a simple macro dynamic model that will
provide a basis to evaluate the monetary policy that we recommended for
the future Chinese economy. The model built here is for an open economy in
which many Keynesian features can be found. The real sector (e.g., product
market and labor market, etc.) of the model resembles to those standard
Keynesian macrodynamic models in which disequilibria are permitted and
the price and wage are adjusted in a staggered way.10 Due to the transition
and developing feature of the current Chinese economy, such a Keynesian
property, we believe, is more important to evaluate the business cycle phe-
nomena as they occur in current Chinese economy.
Since our objective is to evaluate the monetary policy, the model for-
mulation here will be heavily on the ¯nancial sector of the economy. In
particular, we shall distinguish a variety of ¯nancial markets, e.g., money
market, bond market, foreign exchange market, among others. Further, the
model we construct here (especially the ¯nancial sector) does not completely
resemble to the current Chinese economy but to the economy towards which
the Chinese economy may transform in the near future. As we has discussed
in the last section, such a hypothetical economy may imply that money is
not only circulated beyond the domestic market but also endogenous so that
the monetary authority may not be able to control its supply.
10as presented in Chiarella and Flaschel (2000) and Flaschel, Gong and Semmler (2001)
and Chiarella, Flaschel and Franke (2005).
83.1 The Money in Circulation
We shall start with the formulation on the ¯nancial side of the economy. Our
¯rst equation regards the change in the money stock (deposit in commercial
banks) that is circulated in the economy:
Mt = Mt¡1 + ¢Fm;t + ¢Dt (1)
Above Mt is the deposit money in period t; ¢Fm;t is the net transfer of
money from the bond market to the deposit account of the public; and ¢Dt
is the net loan creation from the commercial banks.11 This equation simply
said that the change in money stock either come from the transfer from the
bond market or from the loan creation. In other words, the transaction in
the real market (product market and labor market, etc.) will have no impact
on the stock of money in circulation. This is a plausible assumption since
any transaction in real market will only transfer the money between traders
while leaving the total money in circulation untouched.
If money is endogenous as we have discussed in section 2, the money in
circulation as expressed in (1) should be demand-determined. We therefore
need to formulate the demand for money. Following the textbook discussion,
we may consider the following demand function for money:
M
d
t = h(rb;t) ^ Pt^ Yt; h
0 < 0, h ¸ h0 > 0 (2)
where rb;t is the given bond rate; ^ Pt is the expected price and ^ Yt is the
expected real GDP so that ^ Pt^ Yt is the expected nominal GDP. We here use
the expectation because at the beginning of period t the price and output in
period t have not been known. This formulation indicates that the economy
holds a certain proposition of money as transaction demand over nominal
GDP, though this proposition may change over time, depending on the bond
rate rb;t.12 Also we have assumed a lower bound h0 here of that proportion
so that there will always be some money circulated in the money market for
transactional purpose even if the bond rate is high.




indicating actual money in circulation as expressed in (1) should be equal to
the money demand as expressed in (2).
11Note that here we de¯ne the net loan creation as new created loan minus the returned
loan and the interest payments to the banks.
12The interest rate on deposit is implicitly assumed to be zero in this paper.
9Next we shall discuss how ¢Fm;t and ¢Dt are determined that make the
money in circulation via (1) equal to the money demand as expressed in (2).
We ¯nd that this is indeed a decision on asset allocation between bond and
debt. Also note that ¢Fm;t+¢Dt can be negative, indicating a reduction in
money circulation. This is the case when the demand for money Md
t is less
than the money currently in circulation Mt¡1. Denote ¸t to be the proportion





subject to ¸t 2 [0;1]. This proportion should depend on the comparison
between loan rate rt and bond rate rb;t. In particular, we can write ¸t as
¸t = ¸(rt ¡ rb;t); (5)
Note that we may assume that ¸0 > 0 if ¢Fm;t + ¢Dt is positive, otherwise,
¸0 < 0. This restriction on ¸0 indicates that when additional ¯nancial re-
source is demanded, i.e., ¢Fm;t + ¢Dt > 0, people are more willing to use
the money withdrawn from the bond market if the loan rate is higher relative
to the bond rate. On the other hand, if the money demand is reduced so that
people are withdrawing the money from their deposit, i.e., ¢Fm;t+¢Dt < 0,
then they are more likely to return the loan (or reduce their debt) if the
existing loan rate is higher relative to bond rate.
3.2 The Bond Market
If the capital market is open, as we have assumed for the future Chinese
economy, the bond market here should be connected to the capital market
in the world. Since China is a small economy so that its capital in°ow and
out°ow will have no in°uence on the bond rate in the world market, we can
assume that the bond rate is given exogenously. To simplify our analysis
while without e®ecting our major analytical result, we set this exogenous
bond rate to a constant r¤. This indicates
rb;t = r
¤ (6)
Bonds are supplied by the government and therefore its quantity can be
regarded as being exogenous. To simplify our analysis, we may assume that
all the bonds be matured in one period and therefore the quantity of bonds
could be measured in terms of the total face value circulated in the market.
We denote this quantity as Bt. The demand for bonds comes from the fund
10invested in the bond market. We denote this fund to be Ft. Apparently, the
change in this fund in period t, ¢Ft, can be written as
¢Ft = ¢Fw;t ¡ ¢Fm;t + ¢Fo;t (7)
where ¢Fw;t is the net capital in°ow to the domestic bond market, ¡¢Fm;t
is the net transfer of money from domestic money market to bond market
and ¢Fo;t is the net injection of money by central bank via open market
operation.
Given the demand and supply, the price of the bond will be determined
at the balanced condition of the domestic bond market. We thus have
Pb;tBt = Ft (8)
For a small open economy, the variation in bond price Pb;t should make the
return on domestic bond, or bond rate equal to r¤, the bond rate in the world





which further lead to
Pb;t =
1
1 + r¤ (9)
Substituting (9) into (8), we ¯nd that
Ft =
Bt
1 + r¤ (10)
Equation (10) further indicates that
¢Ft = ¢Bt
1
1 + r¤ (11)
Therefore, if there is no new issued bond circulated in the bond market, i.e.,
¢Bt = 0, the net transfer of money into the bond market ¢Ft will be zero in
order to keep the bond price to be constant as in (9) and so does the bond
rate.
3.3 The Interest Rates in Money Market
Next, we shall discuss the determination of interest rates in the money mar-
ket. Due to the multiple assets in the money market, we can ¯nd a variety
of interest rates. These may include the deposit rate and loan rate in com-
mercial banks, the inter-bank rate (or federal fund rate as named in U. S.)
11and the discount rates for loan and deposit at discount window of the central
bank. Here we can assume the deposit rate at commercial banks to be zero.
The two discount rates can be regarded as policy variables, whose determi-
nation will be discussed later in section 3.8. Our major discussion is thus on
how the commercial loan rate and the inter-bank rate are determined.
In the ¯rst place, we can assume that there is a very close relation between
inter-bank rate and loan rate. For example, we may assume that
rt = b0 + brri;t; b0;br > 0; rt ¸ ri;t (12)
where ri;t is the inter-bank rate. This assumption is supported by the em-
pirical evidence from those economy in which administration plays no rule
in determining the commercial loan interest rate. To some extent, we can
regard the process of loan supply as being that the commercial bank gets the
fund ¯rst at the inter-bank market and then supply the loan to the loan de-
mander whose investment project is evaluated to be rewardable. This leaves
us only to discuss how the inter-bank rate ri;t is determined. The following
proposition regards the determination of inter-bank rate.
Proposition 1 Let d1;t and d2;t denote the two discount rates, the deposit
rate and the loan rate repectively, of the central bank with d1;t · d2;t. Under
the three institutional restrictions as expressed in section 2.5, the determina-
tion of inter-bank rate will follow
d1;t · ri;t · d2;t (13)
while the two discount rates can be set by central bank at its own descretion.
The proof of this proposition is trivial. Assume that d1;t and d2;t are
given while ri;t > d2;t. The demander in the inter-bank market will switch to
the discount window to borrow the fund. This will reduce the demand and
therefore the inter-bank rate will be down. On the other hand, if ri:t < d1;t,
then the loan supplier will prefer to deposit money at the discount window
rather than supply the money at the inter-bank market. This will reduce the
loan supply and therefore the inter-bank rate will be up.
It should be noted that this proposition will not hold without our three
institutional arrangements. Speci¯cally, the central bank cannot set the two
discout rates at its \descretion" so that it cannot use the two discount rates as
policy variables for stabilization purpose even if the inequality (13) still holds.
Here for stabilization purpose, the two discount rates should be adjustable
to any positive value without bring some negative e®ect such as to cause the
continuous arbitrages from individuals or ¯nancial intermediates to borrow
12the money from commercial banks or central bank at a lower rate and buy
bonds for higher return. For example, without arrangement 2 d2;t cannot be
set below the bond rate r¤. Otherwise, the commercial bank will borrow the
money from the central bank to invest in bond market. Similiarly, to avoid
the arbitrage from individuals or other ¯nancial intermediates to borrow the
money from the commerical bank in order to buy bonds while arrangement
1 is absent, the interest rate in commercial loan rt must be higher than the
bond rate r¤. From (12) and (13), this also means that there is some lower
bound to set d2;t given the externally determined bond rate r¤.
Note that equation (13) in proposition 1 also indicates that if d1;t = d2;t =
rd;t, then
ri;t = rd;t (14)
Therefore, if the two discount rates merge, the inter-bank rate ri;t should also
be equal to the merged discount rate rd;t.
3.4 The Foreign Exchange Market
Next, we shall discuss the foreign exchange market at which the exchange
rate is determined. To simplify our analysis, we shall assume that the foreign
direct investment will bring no additional forces to the exchange market. We
may image that those investors simply import their equipments and material
to China as their investment. Therefore when the capital market is opened,
the exchange rate will be determined at the following balanced condition
between demand and supply:
NtPt + ¢Fg;t = EtPt + ¢Fw;t (15)
where Pt is the domestic price; Et and Nt are the real export and import;
¢Fg;t is the net purchase of foreign exchange (dollars) by the central bank and
¢Fw;t is the net capital in°ow, all measured in term of RMB. Apparently
the right side of equation (15) expresses the demand for foreign exchange
(dollars) and the left side the supply.
It is reasonable to assume that both export Et and import Nt depend on
the exchange rate (the detail will be discussed later when we turn to the real
side of the economy) so that we can write them as
Et = E(xt;:::); Nt = N(xt;:::) (16)
Expressing ¢Fw;t in terms of (7) while Et and Nt in terms of (16), the balance
condition (15) in the foreign exchange market can be written as
N(xt;:::)Pt + ¢Fg;t = E(xt;:::)Pt + ¢Ft + ¢Fm;t ¡ ¢Fo;t (17)
13Note that here ¢Ft can be derived from (11), ¢Fm;t from (1) - (4); both
¢Fo;t and ¢Fg;t are the policy variables and thus can be regarded as being
exogenous; ¯nally Pt is determined from the product market, which will
be discussed later. Thus the balance condition in (17) will determine the
equilibrium exchange rate xt.
3.5 Consumption, Investment and Government Expen-
diture
We now leave away from the ¯nancial side and turn to the discussion on the
real side of the economy. To simplify our analysis, we shall assume that the
output Yt is purely determined by the aggregate demand so that
Yt = Ct + It + Gt + Et ¡ Nt (18)
where Ct, It, Gt, Et and Nt are referred to consumption, investment, govern-
ment expenditure, export and import respectively, all measured in real term.
For consumption and government expenditure, we assume that they follow
the simple rule:
Ct = c(Yt¡1 ¡ Tt¡1) (19)
Gt = gYt¡1 (20)
where Tt is the tax; c and µ are constant. We may assume that
Tt = ¿Yt (21)
with ¿ to be the tax rate.
As discussed in Gong and Lin (2005), one possible investment function
for the current Chinese economy can be written as
It=Kt¡1 = »i + »uUt¡1 + »m(mt ¡ pt), »u;»m > 0 (22)
where Kt is the capital stock; mt is the growth rate of the money supply; pt
is the in°ation rate. Therefore, mt ¡ pt is approximately the growth rate of
the real money supply. This investment function, as discussed in Gong and
Lin (2005),13 is consistent with the credit plan that has currently worked as
a major monetary policy mechanism. This mechanism indicates that money
is exogenous and able to be controlled by the central bank. Yet, as we have
discussed in the last section, this monetary policy mechanism will no longer
13where a dynamic optimization model is constructed that allow us to derive the invest-
ment function as expressed in (22).
14hold in the near future due to the ¯nancial reform that is currently proceeding
in China. Money in the future Chinese economy will be endogenous. The
endogenous money indicates that the monetary authority in China will have
to give up its credit plan as its major instrument of monetary policy, but
switch to targeting the interest rate. When this occurs, a more appropriate
investment function should be written as
It=Kt¡1 = »0 + »uUt¡1 ¡ »r(rt ¡ pt) »u;»r > 0 (23)
where rt, the loan interest rate is determined in (12); Equation (23) indicates
that it is the real interest rate rt ¡ pt rather than the credit constraint that
will determine the investment in the future Chinese economy.





Kt = (1 ¡ ±)Kt¡1 + It (25)
where ± is the depreciation rate and A is the output-capital ratio that is
determined by technology.
3.6 The Export and Import
We shall remark that our modeling on export and import is mainly estab-
lished on the empirical evidence that we have observed from Chinese econ-
omy. We assume that the export not only depends on real exchange rate, but
also on external demand from the world market. This consideration allow us
to write the export function as
et = ³0 + ³wyw;t + ³°°t + ³eet¡1; ³w;³°;³e > 0 (26)
Above, et is regarded to be the real export over the real GDP of the last
period: et = Nt
Yt¡1; yw;t is the growth rate of output in the world market,
which generates the demand for China's export; °t is the real exchange rate,







where xt is the nominal exchange rate (RMB/dollar); Pt is the domestic
price index and P
f
t is the price index in the world market. Note that here we
also include the export in the past period to be the determinant to current
export. This indicates that the export may have the habit formation as often
discussed in the consumption theory.
15From our empirical study, we ¯nd that the import in China relies heavily
on the export. In particular, the following equation seems to be signi¯cant:
nt = &0 ¡ &°°t + &eet; &°;&e > 0 (28)
where nt is the real import over the output of the last period: nt = Nt
Yt¡1. More
discussion on import will be made when we turns to empirical estimation.
3.7 Price and Wage Dynamics
Next, we shall discuss how price is determined. We shall not assume that
the price will be determined at the level that can clear the market at every
period. This is particularly true to China since China is still a transitional
and developing economy. Following the widely discussed dual Philip curves
of price and wage (see Flaschel, Gong and Semmler 2001 and Fair 2000), we
may consider the following price and wage dynamics:
wt = ®0 + ®ppt + ®lLt + ®aat, ®p;®n;®x > 0 (29)
pt = ¯0 + ¯wwt¡1 + ¯uUt¡1 ¡ ¯aat¡1, ¯w;¯u;¯x > 0 (30)
where wt is the growth rate of nominal wage; Lt is the employment rate and
at is the growth rate of labor productivity. Apparently, our expression of
price and wage dynamics is based on the fairly symmetric assumptions on
the causes of price and wage in°ation. Both of them are driven, on the one
hand, by a demand pressure component given by Ut¡1 and Lt. On the other
hand, they are driven by a cost push term measured by pt, wt¡1, at¡1 and at
in the right sides of (29) and (30).






t is the labor supply and l(¢) is the demand for labor, which is a
function of output Yt among others. Due to the current dual structure of the
Chinese economy, we would expect that Ls
t could be enormous compared to
the demand for labor. This will e®ect the wage equation. The detail will be
provided when we turn to the empirical estimation of our dynamic model.
3.8 The Monetary Policy
As we have discussed in the last section, the government in the current
Chinese economy sets up a yearly target of money growth, which can be
16regarded as a major macroeconomic policy for demand management and
growth promotion. Once the target has been set up, the monetary authority
employs the credit plan as its principle instrument to implement the target.
Though in many cases the credit plan is only indicative, due to the state-
owned commercial banks in China, the credit plan (which could also be
compulsive especially when the economy is in a serious condition) may have
important impact on the credit supply from the state banks. This indicates
that the actual money supply can be regarded as being exogenous.
However, with the progress of ¯nancial reform, we believe that such a
monetary policy mechanism will no longer work well due to the transfor-
mation of money from being exogenous to endogenous. When the money
becomes endogenous, the monetary authority will have to switch to target-
ing interest rate for its purpose to stabilizing the domestic economy. Since
it is the discount rates through Proposition 1 that determine the inter-bank
rate which further determine the loan rate via (12) and then investment via
(23), we therefore suggest that the monetary authority should use the dis-
count rate as a major instrument of its monetary policy. To keep our analysis
as simple as possible, we even assume one (rather than two) discount rate so
that d1;t = d2;t = rd;t. As expressed in (14) the inter-bank rate in this case is
simply equal to the discount rate rd;t. Suppose that the central bank set the
target in°ation rate as p¤, its interest rate rule can thus be expressed as
rd;t ¡ rd;t¡1 = µ(pt¡1 ¡ p
¤); µ > 0 (31)
This interest rate rule indicates that the central bank will adjust the discount
rate in response to the deviation of actual in°ation to the target in°ation.
Here µ can be regarded as the adjustment speed.
Equation (31) can only be regarded as for stabilizing the domestic econ-
omy. The central bank may also have the responsibility to stabilize the
exchange rate. As expressed in (17), the central bank, for this purpose, can
use the policy variables ¢Fg;t or ¢Fo;t, that is, the trade in foreign exchange
market or the open market operation in bond market.14 Here for simplicity,
we assume ¢Fo;t = 0 and therefore we only consider ¢Fg;t. Suppose that the
central bank target the exchange rate at x¤. We thus ¯nd from (17) that the
rule of trade in foreign exchange market can be written as
¢Fg;t = E(x
¤;:::)Pt ¡ N(x
¤;:::)Pt + ¢Ft + ¢Fm;t (32)
14The open market operation a®ects the foreign exchange market in the followed way.
The injection of money in bond market will increase the demand for bond. Therefore the
bond price increases, and bond rate decreases. The decrease in bond rate will lead the
capital out°own to the world market and thus increase the demand for foreign exchange.
173.9 Estimation
As we have discussed before, the model we constructed here is mainly on the
basis of empirical evidence that can be observed from the Chinese economy.
For this, we should estimate the model by relying the empirical data. The
estimation will be focused on the ¯ve behavior functions (23), (26), (28), (29)
and (30). The data for this estimation is the quarterly data. As well known,
the data in China is often di±cult to be obtained. In many cases, we have to
construct the data by ourselves. In appendix, we provide the detail how the
quarterly data are constructed. Table 1 records the estimated parameters
while Figure 1 shows the match of the estimation with the observation.
Table 1: Estimates of Parameters in Five Behavior Equations















































The estimation equations for the ¯ve behavior functions take the form
it = »0 + »uUt¡1 ¡ »r(rt ¡ pt) + "t (33)
wt = ®0 + ®ppt + ®aat + ºt (34)
pt = ¯0 + ¯wwt¡1 + ¯uUt¡1 ¡ ¯aat¡1 + %t (35)
et = ³0 + ³wyw;t + ³°°t + ³eet¡1 + ´t (36)
nt = &0 ¡ &°°t + &eet + ¹t, ¹t = ½n¹t¡1 + ²t (37)
18Figure 1: Observed and Predicted Interest Rate
19Above it ´ It
Kt¡1, and "t, ºt, %t, ´t and ²t are all assumed to i.i.d. innovations.
We apply the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure to estimate the import function
(37) while the OLS method is directly applied to (33) - (36).
All parameters seem to be signi¯cant except some constants and the pa-
rameters in the import function, which we shall discuss soon. Two points
are noted here.
First, we have dropped the employment rate Lt as the explanatory vari-
able as appearing in the wage equations (29). The estimate ®l with respect
to Lt is not only close to zero but also statistically insigni¯cant. As we have
discussed in section 3.7, the labor supply in current Chinese economy as in
many developing countries is unlimited due to the enormous labor surplus
from rural areas of China. This indicates that we could assume Ls
t = +1.
Given this, we obtain Lt = 0. We shall remark that elsewhere (see Gong
and Lin (2005)), we get the similar result as we employ the annual data for
estimation.
Second, the parameters &° in addition to the constant &0 in the import
function is insigni¯cant. The estimation shows that import in China is mainly
determined by export while its response to the real exchange rate is unclear.
This is probably because in some periods over the sample (1992.3 - 2004.4),
the government may still in°uence the import, though we believe that such
in°uence has been greatly weaken in the recent Chinese economy.
4 The Analysis
In this section, we shall provide the analysis of the model constructed in the
last section. Our purpose here is to evaluate the e®ectiveness of our two
monetary policy rules (31) and (32) under our suggested three institutional
arrangements. The analysis here will lead to our three arguments as we
claimed at the begining of this paper.
4.1 The Intensive Form of the Model
To analyze the model, we shall ¯rst transform the model into an intensive
form. For this purpose, we ¯rst normalize those variables that have upward














20To make our analysis as simple as possible while not a®ecting our major
analytical result, we may also pose the following assumptions:
¢Bt = 0 (39)
^ Pt = Pt¡1(1 + p
¤), ^ Yt = Yt¡1(1 + y
¤) (40)
at = ¹ a, yw;t = ¹ yw, P
f
t = (1 + ¹ pw)P
f
t¡1 (41)
b0 = 0, b1 = 1 (42)
where p¤, y¤, ¹ a, ¹ yw and ¹ pw are all constant. Assumption (39) indicates that
the government does not issue new bonds so that the ¯scal policy is not
considered here. Assumptions (40) and (41) imply that we do not attempt
to model the dynamics of ^ Pt, ^ Yt, at, P
f
t and yw;t and thus we simply take
their averages or assume them to grow at a constant rate. In particular, we
assume that the expected in°ation rate by the public is equal to the target
in°ation rate of the central bank. This is plausible when the central bank
announces its target in°ation rate and the public trusts the ability of the
central bank. Assumption (42) regards the parameters in (12). It indicates
that the loan rate rt is equal to the inter-bank rate and therefore we do not
have to settled the parameters b0 and b1 in our dynamic analysis.
Now we provide the proposition regarding the intensive form of our model.
Proposition 2 Given the assumption as expressed in (39)-(42), the inten-
21sive form of the model can be written as
rt = r(pt¡1;rt¡1)
= rt¡1 + µ(pt¡1 ¡ p
¤) (43)
pt = p(wt¡1;Ut¡1)
= ~ ¯0 + ¯wwt¡1 + ¯uUt¡1 (44)
wt = w(wt¡1;Ut¡1)
= ~ ®0 + ®pp(¢) (45)
°t = °(Ut¡1;wt¡1;°t¡1)
=




= ~ ³0 + ³°°(¢) + ³eet¡1 (47)
nt = n(et¡1;°t¡1;wt¡1;Ut¡1)
= &0 ¡ &°°(¢) + &ee(¢) (48)
it = i(Ut¡1;wt¡1;pt¡1;rt¡1)
= »0 + »uUt¡1 ¡ »rr(¢) + »rp(¢) (49)
yt = y(Ut¡1;wt¡1;pt¡1;rt¡1;°t¡1;et¡1)







1 ¡ ± + i(¢)
(51)
fm;t = f(pt¡1;yt¡1;rt¡1)














(1 + pt¡1)(1 + yt¡1)
¸
(53)
fg;t = ~ f(et¡1;°t¡1;wt¡1;Ut¡1;pt¡1;yt¡1;rt¡1)
= (1 + p(¢))(e(¢) ¡ n(¢)) + f(¢) (54)
where ~ ¯0 = ¯0 ¡ ¯a¹ a; ~ ®0 = ®0 + ®a¹ a; ~ ³0 = ³0 + ³wy¤
w; ~ c = c(1 ¡ ¿) + g ¡ 1
and · = h(r¤)(1 + p¤)(1 + y¤).
The proof of this proposition is given in the appendix.
There are altogether 12 variables in the model. However, the model is
also recursive in the sense that some of the variables have no feedback e®ect
22on the determination of the other variables in the model. These variables
are mainly those of ¯nancial variables fm;t, fg;t, dm;t. Also the variables nt,
it and yt have no feedback e®ect on the other variables in real side of the
economy. Therefore the model has at its minimum 6 dimensions in terms
of (rt, pt, wt, °t, et, Ut). With such a high dimensions for a descrete time
dynamic model, a strict mathematical analysis on its dynamic property is
intractable. Fortunately, we are still able to derive the steady state of the
model.
4.2 The steady state
Next, we shall derive the steady state of the model composed of (43) - (54).
From equation (46), one may ¯rst ¯nd that for the economy to possess a
steady state, the steady state of in°ation must equal the in°ation ¹ pw in the
world market. This further implies from (43) that the central bank has to
settled the target in°ation p¤ to the world in°ation. Another speciality with
regard to the steady state of the model is again from equation (46): the
steady state of the economy, if it does exist and is asymptotically stable,
depends on the initial condition with respect to the domestic and foreign
price level Pt and P
f
t . The following provides the detail regarding the steady
state of the economy.
Proposition 3 Let (¹ r, ¹ p, ¹ w, ¹ °, ¹ e, ¹ n, i, ¹ y, ¹ U, ¹ fm, ¹ dm, ¹ fg) denote respectively
the steady state of (rt, pt, wt, °t, et, nt, it, yt, Ut, fm;t, dm;t, fg;t). Assume
that the economy is asymptotically stable. Then system composed of (43) -
(54) implies that
¹ p = p







~ ³0 + ³°¹ °
1 ¡ ³e
; ¹ n = &0 ¡ &°¹ ° + &e¹ e;
¹ w = ~ ®0 + ®pp




¤ ¡ ~ ¯0 ¡ ¯w ¹ w);
i = ¹ y + ±; ¹ y =
A¹ U [~ c + (1 ¡ &e)¹ e + &°¹ °] + ±




(»0 + »u ¹ U + »r¹ p ¡
¡





(1 + ¹ p)(1 + ¹ y)
¸





(1 + ¹ p)(1 + ¹ y)
¸
; ¹ fg = (1 + ¹ p)(¹ e ¡ ¹ n) + ¹ fm
where P
f
T and PT are the foreign and domestic price index at the period when
the economy has just reached to the steady state.
23The economic meaning of P
f
T and PT can be expressed as follows. Suppose
initially the foreign and domestic prices are at P
f
0 and P0 while the economy





0 (1 + p
¤)
T, PT = P0¦
T
t=0(1 + pt) (55)
We thus ¯nd that for most variables their steady state depend on the initial
conditions P
f
0 and P0, if the economy is asymptotically stable. On the other
hand, we further ¯nd that ¹ p, ¹ w and ¹ U are independent from ¹ ° and therefore
their steady states are certain and not determined by the initial conditions.
4.3 The Monetary Policy in Closed Economy
As we have discussed previously, with such a high dimensions, a formal math-
atical analysis on the dynamic property of our model is intractable. There-
fore, we mainly rely on numerical method to detect the dynamic property
of our model. Our major purpose here is to evaluate the e®ectiveness of
monetary policy as suggested in our model.
To observe the transmission mechanism of monetary policy clearly, we
may ¯rst consider a simple case, the case of closed economy (so that the
export and import are ignored). In this case, only rule (31) is relevant.
Suppose that the monetary policy (31) is not in action, that is, µ = 0 and
thus rt = r0, we ¯rst ¯nd that there is a destabilizing mechanism which leads
the economy inherently unstable:
p "; (r ¡ p) #; i "; y "; U "; p " (56)
To illustrate this destabilization mechanism, we present in ¯gure 2 a sim-
ulation of the model for the closed economy while the monetary policy rule
(31) is absent. In particular, we assume that et = 0, nt = 0, and µ = 0.
Therefore, the dynamic system include (44), (45), (49) and (51) with rt = r0
and
yt = ~ c +
it
AUt¡1
The parameters used in this and the latter simulations are partly given
in table 2, which include those parameters with respect to our ¯ve behavior
functions. The other parameters are provided in table 3.
Table 3: The Other Parameters in the Model
~ c ± a A ¹ yw ¹ pw
¡0:2025 0:0080 0:0298 0:3279 0:0083 0:0092
P
f
0 P0 r¤ h(r¤) y¤ x¤
57 100 0:08 1 0:03 7:5
24Figure 2: Absence of Monetary Policy Rule (31): Closed Economy, µ = 0
25Some of these parameters in table 3 are estimated with the method of
moments by matching the ¯rst moments of the corresponding data. In par-
ticular, ¹ a, ¹ yw and ¹ pw are the sample means of labor productivity at, the U.
S. growth rate in real GDP yw;t and the U. S. in°ation rate pw;t respectively.
The data for estimating A is implied by (24). ¿ is set to g, which is assumed
in the model. x¤ is closed to the current exchange rate (RMB/Dollar). ± is
the depreciation rate that is used for creating capital stock. r¤ is assumed
to be the average bond rate in the world market. y¤ is the expected, on
average, quarterly growth rate of real GDP in Chinese economy. We settle
h(r¤) to 1 indicating that the household and ¯rm keep full cash in advance
for their economic activities in the coming period. We do not have enough
information to set P
f
0 and P0. This is chosen to make the steady states of
export and import in the model (not re°ected in this simulation, but in the
latter simulation) close to the empirical data. The same principle is also
applied to choose ~ c. Here we choose ~ c to make the steady state of yt close
to the corresponding empirical data. The initial condition for this and next
three simulations is set as follows: p0 = 0:01, U0 = 0:8, w0 = 0:03, r0 = 0:09,
i0 = 0:05, y0 = 0:02.
As we can ¯nd in ¯gure 2, the economy in this case is divergent. A
more formal mathematical property of this dynamic system is provided in
the appendix.
Adding monetary policy rule (31) will stabilize the economy by the usual
transmission mechanism of monetary policy:
p "; (r ¡ p) "; i #; y #; U #; p # (57)
As discussed in the literature,15 this transmission mechanism may work well
only if the adjustment speed µ is larger enough so that the interest rate e®ect
resulting from rule (31) and expressed in (57) can cover the price e®ect of
destabilization as expressed in (56). On the other hand, if µ is too large, the
economy could be cyclically explosive.
In ¯gure 3 - 5, the dynamic system is the same as in ¯gure 2, except
here rt follows the monetary policy rule (31) with µ equal to 2:5, 0:0005 and
5 respectively. Here we illustrate the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy rule (31) as expressed in (57). As we can ¯nd, if the interest rate
e®ect resulting from the monetary policy rule (31) is su±cient, indicating an
appropriate adjustment speed µ, the economy in this case can be stabilized
(see ¯gure 3). On the other hand, if the interest rate e®ect is not su±cient,
indicating too small adjustment speed µ, the price e®ect of destabilization
mechanism will be dominant and the economy is still divergent as in ¯gure
15See for instance, Chiarella, Flaschel, Gong and Semmler (2003).
26Figure 3: Su±cient Interest Rate E®ect via Monetary Policy Rule (31):
Closed Economy, µ = 2:5
272 (see ¯gure 4). Finally, if the interest rate e®ect is too strong, indicating
too large µ, the economy could be be cyclically explosive. This implies that
the Hopf-Bifurcation may exist with regard to µ and therefore the model can
generate the limit cycle (see ¯gure 5)
Figure 4: Insu±cient Interest Rate E®ect via Monetary Policy Rule ( 31):
Closed Economy, µ = 0:0005
28Figure 5: Over Su±cient Interest Rate E®ect via Monetary Policy Rule (31):
Closed Economy, µ = 5
294.4 Monetary Policy in Open Economy with Fixed Ex-
change Regime
Now let us consider the second monetary policy rule (32). For this we need to
go back to the open economy. We ¯rst ¯nd that when the second monetary
policy rule (32) is e®ective, that is, to make the exchange rate stabilized,
the price e®ect may also generate the following stabilization mechanism in
addition to the destabilization mechanism as explained in (56):
p "; ° #; (e ¡ n) #; y #; U #; p # (58)
If this price e®ect of stabilization mechanism is su±cient, it may cover the
e®ect generated from destabilization mechanism (56) and therefore the econ-
omy could be asympototically stable even if the central bank does not adopt
the monetary policy rule (31). This is the case which we have shown in ¯gure
6.
The dynamic system in ¯gure 6 includes (44) - (51) with rt = r0 so that
the monetary policy rule (31) is absent though rule (32) is adopted to stabilize
the target exchange rate. The parameters in this simulation are again from
table 2 and 3 except ³e is adjusted down to 80% of its estimate.16 The initial
conditions for et, nt, P
f
0 and P0 are settled respectively to 0.23, 0.21, 57 and
100. The other initial conditions are the same as in ¯gure 2 - 5.
Yet, if the price e®ect generated from stabilization mechanism (58) is not
su±cient comparing to the price e®ect generated from the destabilization
mechanism (56), the economy can still be divergent. To illustrate this situa-
tion, we adjust parameters ³° and &° both down to the 10% of their estimates
so that the price e®ect via real exchange (or stabilization) mechanism is re-
duced. Figure 7 simulates this situation. Here the economy is the same as
in ¯gure 6 except the down-adjustment of ³° and &°.
When the stabilization e®ect of price is not su±cient in comparing to
the destabilization e®ect, the monetary policy rule (31) should be adopted
to stabilize the economy. This is the case we show in ¯gure 8 where we
settle µ to 2.5. As we ¯nd there, the economy regain the stability due to the
monetary policy rule (31).17
16This is to make the steady states of export et and import nt close to the empirical
data. Note that we have indeed changed the model here and therefore some adjustment is
necessary to make steady states match to the empirical data. On the other hand, given the
standard error of the estimate ³e, this down-adjustment is within the interval of statistic
signi¯cance.
17In this simulation, we further adjust the parameters ³0 and &0 down to the 10% of
their estimates. This is to avoid the negative export and import when the economy is
stabilized. Since we have adjusted down the parameters ³° and &°, such further adjustment
is necessary.
30Figure 6: Absence of Monetary Policy Rule (31): Open Economy with Fixed
Exchange Regime
31Figure 7: Absence of Monetary Policy Rule (31) with Insu±cient Stabiliza-
tion E®ect of Price: Open Economy with Fixed Exchange Regime, ³° and &°
are adjusted down
32Figure 8: The E®ective Monetary Policy Rule (31) when Stabilization E®ect
of Price is Insu±cient: Open Economy with Fixed Exchange Regime, µ = 2:5
and ³° and &° are adjusted down
33We thus demonstrate our argument 1: under our three institutional ar-
rangements, the monetary policy (31), though it may not be needed as in
the case of ¯gure 6, can be e®ective independently even if the exchange rate
is ¯xed and the capital market is open.
4.5 Monetary Policy in Open Economy with Flexible
Exchange Regime
Next we shall discuss our argument 2. We have already found that under the
¯xed exchange regime, there exists a stabilization mechanism as expressed
in (58). When this stabilization e®ect is su±cient, there is even no need for
monetary policy rule (31) to stabilize the economy. This seems to suggest
that the ¯xed exchange regime may bring the bene¯t in terms of macroe-
conomic stability. However, for a more rigorous argument, we should also
investigate what could occur if the monetary authority does not adopt the
second monetary policy rule (32) so that the exchange rate can be °oating.
Should in this case the price e®ect from the stabilization mechanism (58) will
be weaken by the exchange rate variation?
To answer this, we shall ¯rst compute the exchange rate xt under the
°exible exchange regime via the following balanced condition at the foreign
exchange market:
(1 + pt)[nt(xt;:::) ¡ et(xt;:::)] = fm;t (59)
This balanced condition is derived from (17) when both sides are divided by
Pt¡1Yt¡1 while ¢Ft, ¢Fo;t and ¢Fg;t are all settled to 0. Here setting ¢Ft and
¢Fo;t to 0 is by assumption. ¢Fg;t = 0 indicates no government intervene in
the foreign exchange market so that the exchange rate is °oating. Also note
from (7) that ¢Fm;t in this case is equivalent to ¢Fw;t, and therefore fm;t
should be understood as the normalized net capital in°ow. Using (47), (48)
and (27), we ¯nd
nt ¡ et = &0 ¡ &°°t + (&e ¡ 1)(~ ³0 + ³°°t + ³eet¡1)






where ¼0 = &0 +(&e ¡1)~ ³0, ¼° = (&e ¡1)³° ¡&°, ¼e = (&e ¡1)³e. Substituting












34where fm;t is given by (52). Given the nominal exchange rate determined in










We have now seen that fm;t, which should be understood as the capital in°ow
in this case, can have impact on the real side of the economy via exchange
rate. We therefore, for dynamic simulation, need to specify the functional





> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
1 if rt > r¤ and (1 + pt¡1)(1 + yt¡1) > 1
0:5 if rt = r¤ and (1 + pt¡1)(1 + yt¡1) > 1
0 if rt < r¤ and (1 + pt¡1)(1 + yt¡1) > 1
0 if rt > r¤ and (1 + pt¡1)(1 + yt¡1) < 1
0:5 if rt = r¤ and (1 + pt¡1)(1 + yt¡1) < 1
1 if rt < r¤ and (1 + pt¡1)(1 + yt¡1) < 1
(62)
This functional form is consistent with restriction that have discussed in
section 3.1. Meanwhile it satis¯es the maximization principle if the risk
premium of assets are not considered. Note that the condition (1+pt¡1)(1+
yt¡1) > 1 indicates the increased money demand, i.e., fm;t + dt > 0 while
(1 + pt¡1)(1 + yt¡1) < 1 indicates fm;t + dt < 0
Given °t as expressed in (61) and ¸(¢) as expressed in (62), we are now
able to simulate the model with the °oating exchange rate. Figure 9 and 10
provides a simulation which resembles the economy in ¯gure 6 except °t here
is replaced by (61) and fm;t is provided by (52) with ¸(rt ¡ r¤) to be given
by (62).18 As we can see, the economy in this case is again unstable. This is
consistent with our argument that the °uctuation in exchange rate will have
negative impact on the economy in terms of macroeconomic stability. Since
the stable exchange rate in domestic country is also applied to the country
of its trader partner, we ¯nd that the bene¯t from the ¯xed exchange rate
in terms of macroeconomic stability can also be shared by the country of its
trade partner.
When the economy is unstable due to the °oating exchange rate, the
monetary policy rule (31) can be adopted to stabilize the economy. In ¯gure
18Here we adjust parameters ³e and ³0 down to the 50% of their estimates. This is
again to avoid the negative export and import when the economy is at the steady state.
Note that here we have changed the model and therefore the adjustment is necessary. The
initial condition for fm;t and xt are settled respectively to 0.1 and 7.5. The other initial
condition is the same as before.
35Figure 9: Absence of Monetary Policy Rule (31): Open Economy with Flex-
ible Exchange System, Part a
36Figure 10: Absence of Monetary Policy Rule (31): Open Economy with
Flexible Exchange System, Part b
3711 and 12, we provides a simulation to the economy that is resemble to the
economy in ¯gure 9 and 10, except the interest rate rt is replaced by the
monetary policy rule (31).
Figure 11: The E®ective Monetary Policy Rule (31): Open Economy with
Flexible Exchange System, Part a
4.6 The Sustainability
Next we shall discuss the sustainability of the target exchange rate, which
leads to our argument 3. Since the central bank has limited foreign exchange
38Figure 12: The E®ective Monetary Policy Rule (31): Open Economy with
Flexible Exchange System, Part b
39reserve, we expect that it can not always use its foreign exchange to intervene
the foreign exchange market. In other words, it cannot keep negative fg;t all
the times. In other words, for the ¯xed regime to be sustainable, we should
set the target exchange rate to the level that results a nonnegative steady
state of fg;t. Of course, it will be better to have the positive steady state.
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where PT and P
f
T are de¯ned in (55). This equation indicates that at period
0 it is quite di±cult to de¯ne equilibrium exchange rate, the exchange rate
which is equal to the right side of equation (63) when evaluated at the steady
state. Since the sustainable target exchange rate x¤ should be at least as high
as the equilibrium exchange rate, we ¯nd that it will be more appropriate
at period 0 to set the target exchange above the equilibrium exchange rate.
In order to avoid the ¯nancial crises, that is, the occurrence of the foreign
exchange reserve to be negative,19 a Monte Carlo simulation (by adding the
variety stochastic shocks to the system) might be needed to help the determi-
nation of target exchange rate. Although this will be an interesting research
in the future, we have already the following conjectures on the sustainability
of the target foreign exchange rate:
² The higher is the current foreign exchange reserve, the higher is the
possibility for a given target exchange rate, which satis¯es (63), to be
sustainable.
² The higher is the target exchange rate (or the more is the RMB under-
valued), the higher is the possibility for the exchange rate to be sus-
tainable.
5 Conclusion and Discussion
This paper studies the monetary policy for the future possible Chinese econ-
omy when capital market is open and the commercial banks are sharehold-
ing with strategical partnership. We suggest that in such an open economy,
money is most likely to be endogenous and therefore the current credit plan
mechanism of monetary policy will not be e®ective as it has currently been
19Here the change in foreign exchange reserve (normalized) should be equal to et+fm;t¡
nt.
40working. Another serious challenge for the managerial mechanism of macroe-
conomic policy in China is that whether China should actually give up the
the current ¯xed exchange rate regime. According to the open economy
tri-lemma, this seems to be the only choice if China want to keep the inde-
pendence of monetary policy for stabilizing the domestic economy.
However, the open economy tri-lemma may be e®ective only under the
restrictions of certain institutional arrangements. For this, we suggest three
institutional arrangements for the future Chinese economy. Given the three
institutional restrictions, we study the monetary policy rule in a model of
open economy constructed for the future Chinese economy. We ¯nd that
the open economy tri-lemma will not hold under our three institutional re-
strictions. Therefore the monetary policy will not lose its independence even
if the capital market is open and the exchange rate is ¯xed. The dynamic
analysis of the model further shows that the ¯xed exchange rate system will
strengthen the stability of the macroeconomy. Meanwhile, in order for the
target exchange rate to be sustainable, the exchange rate in RMB should be
set in such a way that RMB are under-valued. Indeed, the more RMB is
under-valued, the more secure for the target exchange rate to be sustainable.
6 Appendix
6.1 The Proof of Proposition 2
Equation (43) is simply from (31) and (14) when equation (42) hold and the
two discount rates are merged. Equation (44) and (45) are trivial from (30)
and (29) by assuming at = ¹ a. To prove (46), we divide both sides of (27) by


















t¡1(1 + ¹ pw).
We thus ¯nd (46).
Given the equation (46), the proof of the export and import function,
(47) and (48) is trivial from (26) and (28) when yw;t is replaced by y¤
w. The
proof of investment function (49) is also trivial from (23). Next, we prove the


































Substituting the above into (64), we obtain (50).









Expressing It=Yt¡1 in terms of (65) and AKt¡1=Yt¡1 in terms of 1=Ut¡1, we
obtain (51) as in the proposition.
Next, we prove (52). From (1) - (3) when rb;t is replaced by r¤, we ¯rst
¯nds that
¢Fm;t + ¢Dt = h(r
¤)
³
^ Pt^ Yt ¡ ^ Pt¡1^ Yt¡1
´
(66)
Dividing both sides of (66) by Pt¡1Yt¡1 while using assumption (40) and
normalization (38), we obtain from the above
fm;t + dm;t = h(r
¤)
·
Pt¡1(1 + p¤)Yt¡1(1 + y¤)
Pt¡1Yt¡1
¡
Pt¡2(1 + p¤)Yt¡2(1 + y¤)






(1 + pt¡1)(1 + yt¡1)
¸





(1 + pt¡1)(1 + yt¡1)
¸
Expressing ¸t in terms of (5), we get (52). The similarity can also be found
in proving (53).
Finally, we prove (54) by relying on (32). We ¯rst note that when Bt = 0
as assumed in (39), ¢F = 0 as from (11). Now dividing both sides of (32)










= et(1 + pt) ¡ nt(1 + pt) + fm;t
This is indeed (54).
426.2 The Proof of Proposition 3
Equation (43) indicates that at the steady state ¹ p = p¤. Further from (46), if
the steady state ¹ ° does exist (so that °t equals °t¡1 at the steady state), then
we must request that pt at steady state equals ¹ pw. We thus prove ¹ p = p¤ = ¹ pw
as in the proposition.
Using equation (27), the de¯nition on °t, with xt to be replaced by x¤,
we further derive ¹ ° as in the proposition. Given the steady state ¹ °, we can
obtain ¹ e and ¹ n from (47) and (48) respectively. Given the steady state of ¹ p,
¹ w can be obtained from (45) and then ¹ U can be resolved from (44)
To prove the steady state ¹ y, we ¯rst write (51) at the steady state:
¹ U =
(1 + ¹ y)¹ U
1 ¡ ± +
¡
i
This allow us to obtain
i = ¹ y + ± (67)
as in the proposition. On the other hand, (50) implies that at the steady
state
¹ y = ~ c + ¹ e ¡ ¹ n +
i
A¹ U
Expressing i in terms of (67), we obtain from the above
¹ y = ~ c + ¹ e ¡ ¹ n +
¹ y + ±
A¹ U
Solving this equation for ¹ y, we obtain the steady state ¹ y as expressed in the
proposition.
Given the steady state ¹ y, we obtain
¡
i from (67). This further allows us
to derive ¹ r from (49) when evaluated at the steady state. Finally, the steady
states ¹ fm, ¹ dm and ¹ fg are directly computed from (52), (53) and (54) when
evaluated at the steady state.
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